نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
This study examines the feasibility of managing default risk arising from moral hazard in Islamic exchange-based contracts under conditions of asymmetric information, and analyzes the role of Web 3 technology in mitigating this risk. Given the growing importance of exchange-based contracts in Iran’s banking system and the challenges posed by customers’ opportunistic behavior, this research seeks to propose an integrated framework for controlling moral hazard. The methodology is designed in a mixed-methods format: in the first phase, the Delphi technique and the insights of banking and academic experts were used to identify key constructs and indicators. In the second phase, the conceptual model was tested using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). The reliability and validity of the constructs were confirmed through indicators such as Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE). The findings indicate that asymmetric information directly exacerbates moral hazard and ultimately increases default risk in exchange-based contracts. Conversely, Web 3 technology not only has a direct risk-reducing effect on default but also significantly moderates the relationships between moral hazard, asymmetric information, and default. These results suggest that employing smart contracts, blockchain technology, and Web 3-based monitoring mechanisms can enhance transparency and mutual trust and prevent post-contract opportunistic behavior. The novelty of the study lies in integrating agency theory and information economics with the capabilities of Web 3. Furthermore, practical recommendations—such as developing smart contract platforms, enabling secure sharing of credit data, and implementing real-time monitoring of resource allocation—can serve as actionable solutions for managing default risk in the Islamic banking system.
کلیدواژهها English
